A Look at The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 by Lee, David D.
 
A Look at The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation A Look at The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (2002 Third Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:36:36 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10018983
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAA “Lighthearted” Look
at
The Drug Price Competition
and
Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984
David D. Lee
Combined Third-Year Paper/
Final Paper for Food and Drug Law (Winter 2001)
Advisor: Peter Barton Hutt III
April 9, 2002
1TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................3
II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................5
A. Patents ........................................................................................5
1. Justiﬁcations for Patents
........................................................5
2. History of Patent Law ...........................................................6
3. Obtaining a U.S. Patent ..........................................................8
4. Rights that a Patent Provides ...................................................8
B. Food and Drug Law ......................................................................10
1. History of Food and Drug Law
.............................................11
2. Regulation of Drugs .........................................................11
a. Pre-1962 Approval Process
........................................11
b. The 1962 Drug Amendments ....................................12
c. Post-1962 NDAs ...................................................13
d. The Problem with Generics .......................................13
III. HISTORY OF THE ACT ...................................................................16
A. Attempts at Patent Term Restoration
..................................................16
B. ANDA Legislation .........................................................................16
C. The Waxman Drafts .....................................................................19
1. First Waxman Draft
.............................................................19
2. Second Waxman Draft ........................................................20
3. Third Waxman Draft .........................................................23
4. Dissention in the PMA ........................................................24
D. An Uneasy Compromise ..................................................................26
IV. DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION
ACT .....29
A. Title I ........................................................................................29
21. ANDAs ...........................................................................29
2. Exclusivity Periods .............................................................32
3. Pioneer NDAs, paper NDAs, and Trade Secret Information
.............33
B. Title II .......................................................................................35
1. Patent Term Restoration
.......................................................36
2. “Artiﬁcial” Infringement ......................................................37
V. POST-ENACTMENT ........................................................................39
A. Serious Actions after Enactment .......................................................39
B. “Humorous” Interpretations by the Courts ..........................................42
1. Glaxo v. Quigg and Abbott Laboratories v.
Young ........................43
2. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic ..........................................................45
3. Hoechst v. Quigg ..............................................................48
4. SmithKline Beecham v. Watson ..............................................50
VI. CONCLUSION ...............................................................................53
3I. INTRODUCTION
The Hatch-Waxman Act is signiﬁcant to the U.S. healthcare system in many important respects. The robust
generic drug industry owes its very existence to the Act, and patent term extensions or restorations are very
important to the research-based pharmaceutical industry.1 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (DPC-PTR Act), also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,2 achieved many of its
goals. Generic drugs became a major force in the pharmaceutical industry, quickly penetrating into the
marketplace.3 Shortly after the enactment of the Act, a generic drug could capture thirty percent of the
market in a single year after the expiration of a branded product’s patent.4 One startling example of this
was Naprosene. Three months after the patent on Naprosene, seventy-ﬁve percent of its market share was
lost to the generic product.5 Research companies, in losing their exclusive markets for oﬀ-patent drugs,
were pushed into increased research and development to search for new and more proﬁtable drugs. “For
research-intensive companies, the incentive of longer patent protection...has led to a large increase in the
commitment to research in pharmaceuticals.”6
The DPC-PTR Act was a piece of legislation that was fought over bitterly by the generic and research-based
industries, and passed only when a tenuous balance was reached through last-minute negotiations.
1Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ, SYMPOSIUM ISSUE–STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN INNOVATION AND
DRUG PRICE COMPETITION: UNDERSTANDING THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 Food and Drug Law Journal 187, 194 (1999).
2Named after Representative Henry A. Waxman of California and Senator Orrin Hatch of . Also known as the Waxman-
Hatch Act.
3Peck, supra note 3, at 542. The generic industry went from under a billion dollars in sales before the passage of the DPC-
PTR Act in 1984 to approximately $5 billion in sales in 1986. For more on how the DCT-PTR Act has aﬀected the drug industry,
see the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, How Increased Competition From Generic Drugs Hass Aﬀected Prices and Returns in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, CBO Study, (July 1998). For background on the economics of competition in pharmaceuticals before
the enactment of the DPC-PTR Act, see Meir Statman, Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The declining
profitability of Drug Innovation (1983).
4Jonathan C. Peck, The Long-Term Eﬀects of Recent Legislation on the Drug Industry, 43 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal
541, 5422 (1988).
5Mossinghoﬀ, supra note 1, at 191.
6Peck, supra note 3, at 542
4One indication of the controversial nature and sensitivity of the coalition was that there is
almost none of the usual legislative history to this bill. There are no Senate reports, for
example, and ﬂoor statements were extremely limited and dealt with only a small number
of technical points. To really understand the intent of this legislation, one almost had to be
there as it was negotiated.7
The passage of the legislation did not stop the two sides from feuding with each another. This naturally
led to litigation. But due to the incomplete legislative history, ambiguous language of the Act, and the
imaginative theories of the lawyers for the opposing drug companies, the courts have had to wrestle with the
conﬂicting language and principles of the Act. With many millions of dollars often at stake, the outcomes of
these cases were important to both innovators, copiers, and consumers. However, in spite of the seriousness
of the matters that the DPC-PTR Act inﬂuenced, some of the opinions that resulted from litigation on the
Act are perplexing. This paper will provide a general history of the passage and the ﬁrst few years of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, and will examine the contrast between
the serious nature of the Act and some of the “humorous” judicial opinions that resulted from it.
5II. BACKGROUND
A. PATENTS
Patent law seeks to penetrate the very essence of human nature in that it appeals to a certain primal
behavioral characteristic: it oﬀers potential ﬁnancial reward as an inducement to invent, to disclose, or to
invest.” 8 Patent law attempts to balance the creation of innovation with the dissemination of innovation.
In exchange for publicly disclosing and teaching others how to practice a new innovation, the public grants
the innovator exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the innovation for a limited period of time.
1. Justiﬁcations for Patents
The most widely accepted justiﬁcation for patents in the United States is the consequentialist or utilitarian
justiﬁcation, which focuses on the consequences of patent law on the public welfare.9 Utilitarianism holds
that by granting property rights to an inventor for a limited period of time, an incentive is created for
individuals to invent. Although the public is temporarily burdened this monopoly, the net utility of the
community is maximized, due to the increased innovation that will eventually become available for use.10
There are at least four types of incentives that patent law uses to spur innovation.11 By allowing an investor
to recoup the costs of invention through monopoly rights, an incentive to invest is created. Patent protection
8Donald S. Chisum et al., Principles of Patent Law 1 (1998).
9Indeed, the predominant justiﬁcation for American intellectual property law has been, without question, utilitarianism or
consequentialism. The patent and copyright clause of the Constitution itself... can be read as predominantly utilitarian in
nature. Id. at 46.
10The other major justiﬁcation for patents is the deontological or natural rights justiﬁcation, where the purpose of patent
law is to protect the rights of the inventor, irrespective of the eﬀects on public welfare. This justiﬁcation is based in large part
on Locke’s natural rights labor theory. Id. at 35-45.
11Id. at 62.
6give inventors an incentive to disclose their invention in a patent instead of relying on trade secret protections.
Patents also give third parties an incentive to commercialize products and bring to market inventions that
might otherwise be deemed too risky to invest in. Finally, by giving exclusive rights to one party to practice
a particular invention, patent law creates an incentive to design-around the patent, thereby further spurring
innovation to create new inventions.12
2. History of Patent Law
The modern patent system has its roots in Renaissance Italy, where the ﬁrst patent statute was enacted
in the Venetian Republic on March 19, 1474, and had many of the same requirements that modern patent
statutes mandate.13 The system of patents spread quickly through Europe, due largely to the migration
of Venetian artisans and craftsman.14 Patents became a way to attract foreign knowledge and to foster
innovation in domestic industries.
The system of granting exclusive rights for inventions also made its way to England. However, the abuse of
granting importation franchises and other monopolies as political favors led Parliament to enact the Statute
12These incentives were recognized by the Supreme Court. First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once the
patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain
there for the free use of the public. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
13We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices; and in view of the grandeur and virtue
of our city, more such men come to us every day from diverse parts. Now, if provision were made for the works and devices
discovered by such persons, so that others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor’s honor away, more
men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build devices of great utility and beneﬁt to our commonwealth.
Therefore:
Be it enacted that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this City,
not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the oﬃce of our General Welfare Board when it has been
reduced to perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to every other person in any of our territories and
towns to make any further device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for the
term of 10 years. And if anybody builds it in violation hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to have him
summoned before any magistrate of the City, by which magistrate the said infringer shall be constrained to pay him hundred
ducats; and the device shall be destroyed at once. It being, however, within the power and discretion of the Government, in its
activities, to take and use any such device and instrument, with this condition however that no one by the author shall operate
it. 6, Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. Pat. Oﬀ. Soc’y 166, 176-177 (1948).
14Chisum, supra note 8, at 12.
7of Monopolies in 1624. This statute declared all monopolies as void with the exception of patents granted
to those who practiced a manner of new manufacture. which became the foundation of the British patent
system. This system in turn shaped the development of patent law in the American colonies.
Patents in the colonies were initially granted by the individual states. After the Revolutionary War, the
individual states still retained the power to grant patents under the Articles of Confederation. However, the
framers of the Constitution saw the need for a uniﬁed federal patent system. Congress was therefore given
the power [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.15
The ﬁrst patent statute was the Patent Act of 1790.16 It designated a patent board, which examined
patent applications to see if the invention or discovery was important enough to warrant a patent. In 1793
the examination system was replaced by a registration system, which did not examine the applications,
opening the door for deception and fraud. The 1836 Patent Act reintroduced the requirement that a patent
application be examined for novelty17 and utility.18 In 1850 the Supreme Court’s decision in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood19 added the nonobviousness requirement to the list of requirements that an invention.20
Congress, in more recent times, has made changes to the patent statute when the decisions made by courts
do not oﬀer enough protection. The 1952 Act responded to the weakening of patent protection that had been
occurring as a result of the negative attitudes of the Supreme Court towards patents. This Act once again
make patents an important incentive for American inventors and companies.21 In 1982 Congress, reacting
to the inconsistencies in patent doctrine amongst the various circuit courts, established the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, for the purpose of unifying patent law in the United States.22 Today, patents are critical
15Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 8.
16Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
17The innovation must not have been practiced before in the country. See 35 U.S.C. §102.
18The invention must be useful. See 35 U.S.C. §101.
19Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
20The invention must not be obvious to a person who is of ordinary skill in the ﬁeld of the invention. See 35 U.S.C. §103.
21Chisum, supra note 8, at 22-23.
22Id. at 23-25.
8assets to companies involved in new technologies, and have been a major driving behind the great advances
in technological innovations over the past few decades.
3. Obtaining a U.S. Patent
To obtain a patent on a new invention, an inventor submits an application to the Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (PTO) that includes a disclosure, or description, of the invention and speciﬁc claims as to what is
being patented. The application then undergoes an examination process where the PTO determines whether
or not the invention meets the statutory requirements to be granted a patent. The invention must meet
the requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. The description is scrutinized to make sure that
it suﬃciently describes the invention and allows others to practice the invention once the patent expires.23
The application must also have at least one claim, which speciﬁes what the invention is that the applicant
is requesting a patent for.
Prior to the enactment of the DPC-PTR Act, the term of a patent for all inventions was 17 years from its
date of issuance.24 An inventor had to ﬁle an application for a patent within a certain time period after
knowledge of the invention becomes public.25 This requirement prevented the unnatural lengthening of the
term of a patent.
23The disclosure must 1) be suﬃcient in detail to teach others how to practice the invention without undue experimentation
(enablement), 2) disclose the best method known to the inventor of practicing the invention (best mode), and 3) be suﬃcient
in detail to show others that the patent holder possess the invention (written description). See 35 U.S.C. §112.
24The 17-year term for patents was changed as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements of 1994. The Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) led to a harmonization of the term for U.S. patents with that of the
international community. For patent applications ﬁled on or after June 8, 1995, the length of a patent term is now 20 years
from the date of ﬁling the patent application.
25A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-... (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent in the United States... 35 U.S.C. §102(b).
94. Rights That a Patent Provides
A patent confers upon its holder the right to exclude others from practicing the invention for the term of
the patent; others are not allowed to make, use, sell, or oﬀer to sell the invention within the United States
without permission from the patentee.26 Patentees can bring cases for damages as well as injunctive relief to
stop infringers from practicing the claimed invention. Cases involving patent issues are litigated in federal
district courts, with all appeals going to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
Patents within the pharmaceutical industry are particularly valuable.27 The nature of the industry is one
where there are very large initial costs for research and development, but subsequent manufacture of the
drug is relatively inexpensive, and therefore the ability to copy the drug by others is low. Research-based
pharmaceutical companies have relied upon the protection provided to them by patents to charge higher
prices on their drugs in order to recoup their initial investments in R & D. The revenue from a blockbuster
drug must also cover the investment made in the hundreds of other compounds that went through various
stages of testing but did not reach the commercial market.
Patents for pharmaceuticals are also very controversial. Many ﬁnd the idea of corporations proﬁting on
monopolistic prices for drugs to be unethical, especially for life-saving medications. Prescription drugs are
also largely consumed by the elderly, who tend to have more trouble coping with the higher prices of patented
drugs. In fact, many countries have resisted granting patents on drugs, or have compulsory licenses that
2635 U.S.C. §271.
27At no time in history has there been greater public expectation that the science and technology community will devise
solutions to dietary, health, environmental, and other problems. It is to this community that the public and public oﬃcials
look for the prevention or cure of heart disease, cancer, and AIDS, for better biodegradable materials, for more eﬃcient energy
use, etc.
This clamor for new technology comes at a time when there is public resistance to higher taxes, which are necessary to
support high levels of government spending on research and development. Universities and private ﬁrms must rely increasingly
on private ﬁnancing for both basic and applied research, which may be unavailable without the prospect of ﬁnancial return to
which patents can contribute. Donald S. Chisum and Michael Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property 1-2, n. 1
(1992).
10allow generic drug companies to manufacture copies of life-saving drugs at a reduced cost.
B. FOOD AND DRUG LAW
The adulteration of the food supply is an ancient problem. For centuries consumers often had to look out
for themselves. Today, the governmental regulation of the food supply protects the consumer against fraud;
prevents the sale of unsafe foods; and informs the consumer about nutrition. It has also expanded to cover
not only foods, but drugs, food additives, and medical devices.
1. History of FDA
Formerly the Chemical Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulates the safety of foods, and the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs, medical devices, and biologics.28
Throughout its history FDA has had essentially the same assignment: to assure that the products it regulates
are safe and truthfully labeled.
In response to the growing need for a uniform national regulation of the food supply, the 1906 Act was
enacted, which forbade interstate commerce in adulterated and misbranded foods and drugs. The Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA), responding to the deaths caused by Elixer Sulfanilamide,
required a premarket review of drugs before they were able to enter the market.29 This Act, as well as
its amendments, kept this basic format of the 1906 Act but enlarged the scope of the legislation with new
deﬁnitions of adulteration and misbranding.30
28Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 5 (2d ed. 1991).
29Id. at 476.
30Id. at 12.
112. Regulation of Drugs
The worldwide scare caused by thalidomide in the middle of the 20th century brought about the 1962 Drug
Amendments. These amendments made the regulation of drugs the single most controversial, and perhaps
the most important, of FDA’s activities.31
a. Pre-1962 Approval Process
The 1938 Act looked primarily to see if a drug was labeled falsely or in a misleading manner. To implement
the provisions of the statute, FDA used a system by which applications for the approval of new drugs were
allowed to become “eﬀective.” In 1942, in order to reduce the volume of work, FDA began to distinguish new
drugs from old drugs. Manufacturers of old drugs could obtain an opinion letter from FDA (or alternatively,
make their own determination) that their product was considered generally recognized as safe (GRAS), if
an NDA was in eﬀect for a version manufactured by another company. A new drug that received an NDA
became known the pioneer, and all the subsequent versions of the drug became known as generic or me-too
drugs.32
b. The 1962 Drug Amendments
The Drug Amendments of 196233 transformed the system of premarket notiﬁcation into one that required
individual premarket approval of the safety and eﬀectiveness of every new drug submitted to FDA. FDA
began the process of inserting the eﬃcacy requirements into the approval process by extending the deﬁnition
31Id. at 13.
32Id. at 477-478.
33Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 State. 780 (1962).
12of a new drug to comprise drugs not generally recognized as safe and eﬀective. The data reporting require-
ments of the new drug approval procedure were amended to require submission of data showing eﬃcacy, and
a positive act of approval was now required to approve an NDA.
FDA was required to refuse approval of any NDA if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, it was de-
termined that on the basis of information submitted that there was a lack of substantial evidence that the
drug would have the eﬀect that it claimed to have. FDA could withdraw approval of any drug after notice
and opportunity for hearing if it was found that substantial evidence of eﬃcacy was lacking after reviewing
the new information presented. The FDA could also withdraw approval of a NDA if there was an imminent
hazard to health.34
c. Post-1962 NDAs
The post-1962 process for obtaining FDA approval of a new drug is long, time-consuming, and expensive.
The sponsor of a new drug ﬁrst spends several years determining the few compounds out of thousands that
merit additional research. Preclinical data on the chemistry, pharmacology, and toxicology of the compound
is then gathered and submitted to FDA in a Claimed Exemption for an Investigational New Drug, or IND.
If the IND is not rejected, clinical studies in humans is initiated.
There are three phases of clinical testing. Phase I involves only a few healthy subjects to test for adverse
eﬀects. Phase II then examines if there are actual therapeutic eﬀects when the drug is administered to
patients with the disease to be treated. Phase III calls for administering the drug to hundreds of patients
to detect adverse eﬀects, potential interactions with other drugs, etc. If the drug passes all three phases
34Hutt, supra note 28, at 476-477.
13successfully, the data is gathered into a New Drug Application (NDA) and submitted to FDA for approval.
FDA then makes a determination as to the safety and eﬀectiveness of the drug and whether the beneﬁts of
the drug outweigh the risks. Only after FDA approves the NDA can a manufacturer begin to market the
drug.
The period of time it took for a new drug to move from the ﬁling of an IND to ﬁnal NDA approval had
been steadily increasing. Meanwhile, the term of the patent, which is usually issued well before the NDA is
submitted, is eﬀectively shortened by the approval process.
d. The Problem with Generics
As stated above, the 1938 Act did not require FDA to aﬃrmatively approve NDAs, but rather allowed them
to become eﬀective. When the Drug Amendments of 1962 were enacted, they required FDA to review all
NDAs that had become eﬀective in the past twenty-four years to determine if they met the new eﬀectiveness
standards. In 1966, manufacturers submitted information on their drugs to the National Academy of Science
(NAS) to review their eﬀectiveness.35 In 1968 FDA announced that it would apply the ﬁndings from the
studies to the me-too versions of the pioneer drug, and the pre-1962 opinion letters on old drugs were
withdrawn. An abbreviated NDA was created, which required information only on biological availability
and manufacturing controls.
Due to the backlog of abbreviated NDAs, FDA informally began to allow the marketing of me-too drugs
upon submission of an abbreviated NDA, without having to wait for formal approval. It then proposed
regulations that would not require an NDA or abbreviated NDA for me-too drugs that were generics of a
pioneer drug that had passed the DESI program. This issue was brought to the Supreme Court, where it was
35Id. at 477-483.
14determined that the Act’s deﬁnition of drug includes inactive as well as active ingredients, and so therefore
every generic is required to submit an NDA or abbreviated NDA if there is any signiﬁcant diﬀerence with
the pioneer.36
Essentially, a generic manufacturer was able to ﬁle an abbreviated NDA for a generic version of a pre-1962
pioneer drug that had passed the new approval requirements. However, the FDA insisted that a full NDA
be submitted for any generic version of a post-1962 new drug. Because data from the pioneer NDAs was
considered conﬁdential and were not disclosed to the public37 (and therefore to generic manufacturers), the
only way to submit a full NDA was to conduct clinical testing. In 1978, FDA announced that it would
accept a paper NDA that used published information on the pioneer’s safety and eﬀectiveness, but only a
small fraction of drugs would have suﬃcient data published on them for generics to use in a paper NDA.
Thus, in many cases, generic drugs were eﬀectively excluded from entering the market and competing with
pioneer drugs.38
36United States v. Generic Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 455 (1983).
37Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1982).
38Hutt, supra note 28, at 484-485.
15III. HISTORY OF THE ACT39
A. The Basic Dilemma
This Act [the DPC-PTR Act] resulted in part from two unintentional eﬀects of FDA’s
implementation of the 1962 drug amendments. On the one hand, the stringent eﬃcacy
requirements of the ’62 amendments resulted in a substantial loss of patent life during the
lengthy period necessary for FDA to review a new drug application (NDA). On the other
hand, because it became so diﬃcult to obtain an NDA, the NDA itself provided a form
of exclusivity, a type of patent in fact, a result that stymied the development of generic
pharmaceuticals.40
These undesired changes in the eﬀective patent term became known as the front-end and back-end distortions,
respectively. There were over 150 drugs that were “oﬀ-patent” and had no generic competition. FDA had
been working on implementing regulations that would have allowed generics to ﬁnally enter the market of
drugs that had gone oﬀ-patent, but was running into constant delays. If this happened without an increase in
the eﬀective patent term, it would have seriously cut into the revenue of the owners of these drugs, hampering
innovation from the pioneer drug companies.
B. Attempts at Patent Restoration
In 1978 President Carter initiated a domestic policy review of industrial innovation, the goal of which was
to stimulate jobs, improve the balance of trade, and improve other economic conditions.41 Several of the
advisory subcommittees recommended lengthening the patent term to make up for time consumed in gov-
ernmental regulatory requirements. The eﬀective life of a patent for a pharmaceutical product had been
steadily decreasing, to the point where it became clear that less than half the patent life remained by the
39For a more complete description of the events that led to the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, See Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 Journal of the Patent Oﬃce Society 526 (1985); Fox, supra
note 7. The Annotated Bibliography provides a compilation of the legislative predecessors of the Act.
41Lourie, supra note 39, at 526-7.
16time the average drug product was approved for marketing.42
In response, Congressman Symes of Ohio introduced H.R. 3589 in 1979. This simple bill proposed to set the
expiration date of a patent for a human or animal drug to be 17 years after approval to market the drug
or 27 years from the issuance of the patent, whichever came ﬁrst. The Chemical Manufacturers Association
(CMA) and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) also started working on the problem. This
produced S. 2892, introduced in 1980 by Senators Bayh, Thurmond, Mathias, Morgan, and Percy, and H.R.
7952, by Congressmen Kastenmeier and Sawyer.
The bill deﬁned a regulatory review period for human and animal drugs43, beginning from the ﬁling of
documents with the regulatory review agency and ending with the grant of approval to market the product.
In attempting to reduce opposition to the bill, the promoters did not try to overreach. The bill provided for
a maximum extension of 7 years, and the total eﬀective life of the patent could not exceed 17 years; patents
covering chemical products and processes were covered, but not processes of manufacture. Furthermore, the
extension did not cover all compounds of the involved patent or claim, nor all uses.44 The system was ad-
ministratively simple, merely requiring review by the PTO of data on the regulatory delay before extension
of the patent. However, no action was taken on the bill due to the schedule, so the issue was pushed to the
next Congress.
On Jan 27, 1981, S. 255, sponsored by Senator Mathias et al., was introduced. It was very similar to previ-
ous bill. However, one change was made to extend patent term extension to any type of product subject to
premarket regulatory review. This was done to bring in as much support as possible for the bill from other
interest groups. The bill also limited the amount of extension available to products already in the process
of regulatory review. S. 255 was passed by full Senate in a voice vote on July 9, 1981.
42Id. at 527.
43The bill also deﬁned a regulatory review period for medical devices, food and color additives, pesticides, and chemicals
regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
44Known as the Kodak Amendment, under the reasoning that a compound should not receive lengthened patent protection
for use as a drug and for other uses. Lourie, supra note 39, at 528.
17In the House, H.R. 1937 was introduced by Congressmen Kastenmeier and Sawyer. But opposition had
arisen from generic drug manufacturers, retired persons groups, and public interest groups, who testiﬁed
against the bill at the hearings on the bill.45 This led to the request for the Oﬃce of Technology Assessment
to study the matter. Its report, in 1982, conﬁrmed that patent extension could encourage the development
of new drugs through incentives provided to the patent owner.46
A clean bill, H.R. 6444, was reported out to the subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice. Among the amendments were further restrictions on the amount of patent extension that
could be granted, including the Kastenmeier prospectivity amendment No. 5, which precluded extension of
patents granted prior to the enactment of the bill. Process patents were also made eligible for extension,
provided there wasn’t a patent on the product as well that had been extended. The bill was reported out
to the full Judiciary committee, and then to the House ﬂoor on July 28, 1982. A combination of intense
lobbying and unusual circumstances on the day of voting left the bill short by 5 votes on Sept. 15, 1982.47
C. ANDA Legislation
The patent term restoration bill had been defeated through the eﬀorts of Representative Waxman, chairman
of the health subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Waxman wanted to pass
legislation that would allow generics to obtain FDA approval quickly, i.e. via abbreviated NDAs.48 He
introduced H.R. 3605 on July 19, 1983. The bill removed the requirement that evidence of safety and
eﬃcacy need to be submitted to FDA for a generic version of a drug, as long as met the same standards of
45Lourie, supra note 39, at 530.
46Id. at 530.
47Id. Bad weather that day prevented some congressmen who were in favor of the bill from getting to Washington to cast
their votes, and the rules committee did not allow for a second vote.
48Id. at 533.
18identity, strength, quality, purity, stability, bioavailability, and bioequivalence as the pioneer drug.49
Duplicates of the patent term bill that had passed the Senate in 1981, S. 1306 and H.R. 3502, were also
introduced during this time. The two sides began talks in an attempt to bring about a compromise that
would combine the two bills. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA)50 and the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association (GPIA) became the two main advocates, respectively, for the research-
based industry and the generic companies.51
D. The Waxman Drafts
In January 1984, a compromise in principle was agreed upon by both parties. It called for a maximum
restoration period of 5 years, and the total eﬀective life for a patent could not be extended beyond 14 years.
There would only be a 2 year restoration available for drugs already in the process of regulatory approval.
Furthermore, only one patent per product could be extended, and diligence must have been used to pursue
regulatory approval.
Generic products were to be approved as long as they were shown to be bioequivalent to the pioneer drug.
As a concession to the research based industry, several exclusivity periods were provided. There was to be
a 10-year delay before any ANDA could be approved for a generic version of a drug that was ﬁrst approved
betwen January 1, 1982 and the enactment of the bill (a pipeline drug). There was also to be a 4-year period
when ANDAs could not be approved for unpatentable products.
Most importantly, the court decision in the recently decided Pﬁzer v. International Rectiﬁer52 was to be
49Id.
50For more on the PMA, see William C. Cray, The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association: The First 30 Years
(1989).
51Id.
52Pﬁzer v. International Rectiﬁer, 217 U.S. P.Q. 157 (C.D.Cal. 1982).
19reversed. This case held for the ﬁrst time that it was patent infringement to conduct research and testing
when the patent was still eﬀective, even if the data was not submitted to FDA until after the patent term
expired. Waxman strongly felt that a patent holder should not be entitled to the additional exclusivity that
would result from delaying the studies required to obtain approval from the FDA.53
1. The First Waxman Draft
The ﬁrst Waxman draft was produced on April 4, 1984. The research-based industry was not pleased with
it for a number or reasons. The major source of discontent was the issue of evergreening. Generic companies
contended that pioneer drug companies would procure multiple product, process, and use patents on the
same drug, over a period of years. This, in eﬀect, lengthened the time in which a product would enjoy
exclusivity under a patent. The pioneer companies argued that multiple patents on a drug resulted from
continued invention and innovation, and that subsequent patents with new claims did not preclude others
from using inventions claimed in the earlier, expired patents. 54
The anti-evergreening provisions in the ﬁrst Waxman draft prevented extension of a patent where the product
was disclosed or claimed in an earlier issued patent, no matter who owned the patent or what country the
patent was issued from. Additionally, new use patents were not eligible for extension, and process patents
could only be extended if there was no prior patent on the compound, the method of use, or the preparation
process. Furthermore, there would be no patent extension if the patent covered any earlier approved product.
A mandatory diligence review was also required for patent extension requests.
While the ﬁrst Waxman draft had much that the research-based companies were unhappy about, it made
53Insistence on this point would lead to much controversy and diﬃculty in the coming months. Lourie, supra note 39, at 535.
54“Already, it has been noted that companies have a disincentive for research into small but real improvements in drug
formulation or delivery for existing products.” Peck, supra note 3, at 543.
20it relatively easy for generic companies submitting ANDAs to get approval. The FDA was not allowed to
require proof of safety and eﬃcacy, and a second ingredient in a combination was allowed to be varied upon
petition. An ANDA applicant would certify when the relevant patent would expire, and would not receive
approval until after that date. However, the generic companies wanted to be able to challenge patents that
it felt were invalid. If the generic applicant certiﬁed that a relevant patent was invalid or infringed by sale
of the generic product, approval would be deferred for only 30 days to give the patent owner time to go to
court and enforce their patent through a preliminary injunction.
This remedy was not acceptable for the research-based companies. Preliminary injunctions normally require a
showing that the patent is valid beyond question, a very diﬃcult standard to meet without prior adjudications
of validity or evidence of acquiescence by others to the patent’s validity. The Waxman bill would have allowed
ANDAs to be submitted and approved soon after a pioneer drug’s NDA had been approved, giving little
time for these types of evidence to exist. Retroactively pulling the generic from the market after years of
litigation would not remedy the considerable harm to the pioneer drug’s market share in the interim.
2. The Second Waxman Draft
A second draft came into being on April 25. Disclosure in foreign patents were no longer a bar to patent
extension. Furthermore, extension was no longer barred by the mere disclosure of a compound in a prior
patent, but a generic claim was. This was a problem due to the procedural nature of obtaining patents
and restriction requirements in the PTO. The diligence review was no longer mandatory, only occurring on
petition.
To address the concerns of the research-based industry regarding the approval of ANDAs, a patent owner
21would have 60 days instead of 30 to defer approval of an ANDA by either 1) seeking a preliminary injunction
through the court system, or 2) using the PTO’s reexamination process to determine whether the allegations
raised a substantial new question on patentability. The ANDA would be delayed until 1) a preliminary
injunction was denied by the court, or 2) when the PTO determined that there was no new question of
patentability and a declaratory judgment by the patent owner was ruled in favor of the challenger. However,
this oﬀer by the drafters was also undesirable to the research-based industry. The addition of a 180-day
period of exclusivity for the ﬁrst successful challenger to an invalid patent also made the research-based
industry feel as if they were being speciﬁcally targeted.
A few days before the second draft came out, the recently-created Federal Circuit decided Roche v. Bolar
(Roche-Bolar),55 which made the decision in Rectiﬁer the national rule of law. Pre-patent expiration activi-
ties conducted for the purpose of obtaining data for submission to a federal regulatory agency now constituted
infringement. The research-based companies were now even more unwilling to accept the compromise bill.
3. The Third Waxman Draft
The drafters working on the bill now had to deal with the new Federal Circuit decision. The solution devised
by the Waxman staﬀ was to reverse the holding in Roche-Bolar only to the extent that a generic company
had no intent to commercialize the drug before the patent expiration date, but only conducted formerly
infringing activities for the purpose of gathering information for FDA approval. This intent would be shown
by the notice that a generic manufacturer gave to a patentee indicating the nature of the patent certiﬁcation
submitted to the FDA. If the generic company stated that the patents were valid, then the ANDA would be
approved after the date the patent expired.
55Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
22However, if a generic company wanted to challenge patents that it felt were invalid or not infringed upon,
the ANDA applicant’s notice would state their intent to obtain marketing approval prior to the patent’s
expiration date. The drafters then deﬁned this act to be an infringement of the patent, which would then
allow the patent owner to bring suit. Approval of an ANDA would be delayed until the litigation between
the two parties was ﬁnished.
This type of action was highly structured; the process described in the statute was the only one available, and
venue for the declaratory judgment action was limited to the principal place of business for the defendant or
a regular and established place of business.56 The trigger date for litigation was to begin with the submission
of an ANDA, with an 18-month period of delay in ANDA approval. The anti-evergreening statutes were also
changed so that a prior generic patent claim of another party would not preclude extension of a patent on a
later compound, but a later-use patent could not get an extension.
H.R. 3605 was then reported out by the Energy and Commerce Committee as the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Senators Hatch, Mathias, Kennedy, and DeConcini sponsored
the comparable Senate bill, S. 2748.
4. Dissention in the PMA
56For more on the venue provisions of the Act, see John C. O’Quinn, NOTE: THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME: FINDING
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN ANDA PATENT CASES AFTER ZENECA V. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, 13 Harv.
J. Law & Tec 129 (1999).
23By June many felt that a workable compromise had ﬁnally been reached.57 There were hearings in the House
on June 27, 1984. PTO Commissioner Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ objected to the remaining anti-evergreening
provisions of the bill, and urged that Congress not overturn Roche-Bolar. He argued that these provisions
weakened the United States’ arguments to other countries that they should improve their patent protections.
Mossinghoﬀ also felt that the act would impose a signiﬁcant burden upon the PTO. The next day, hearings
were held in the Senate, with the Acting Commissioner of FDA, Dr. Mark Norvitch, objecting to certain
parts of the ANDA provisions as burdensome to FDA. At the hearings, representatives of the PMA and
GPIA stated that the bill was the best compromise that could be accomplished under the circumstances.
However, the PMA was divided, with many of the dissenting companies being among the industry leaders.58
These companies felt that the bill was deﬁcient in its anti-evergreening provisions, and were unhappy with
the partial reversal of Roche-Bolar. Six of the leading dissenting companies attempted to stall the legislation
to little avail.59 These companies then began intensive lobbying eﬀorts in Congress to defeat the bill.60
A mark-up session on June 25 had the PTO, through Representative Moorhead, oﬀer up several amendments
addressing its concerns. All these amendments were struck down, as Kastenmeier, although he felt that
the amendments did have some merit, did not want to upset the balance achieved by the parties involved.
Amendments oﬀered by the dissenting companies were also defeated. This did not stop them from continuing
their lobbying and negotiation eﬀorts. At this point there were eleven dissenting companies, who combined
57Philip M. Boﬀey, Accord May Lead to Cheaper Drugs, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1984, at 1.
58An industry source said the opponents included such giants as Hoﬀmann-La Roche Inc., Merck Sharpe & Dohme, the
Bristol-Myers Company, Johnson & Johnson, E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc., the Ciba-Geigy Corporation, the Schering-Plough
Corporation, the A.H. Robins Company, the American Cyanamid Company and the American Home Products Corporation.
Id.
59Irvin Molosky, Big Drug Makers Fail to Stall Bill Aiding Generics, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1984, at D2.
60Martha M. Hamilton, Bill Widening Availability to Generic Drugs Advances, The Washington Post, June 13, 1984, at F1.
24conducted about 50 percent of the research and development done in the pharmaceutical industry, therefore
standing to lose the most from laws allowing generic drugs faster access to the market.
Intense negotiations with the dissenting companies led to the following last-minute changes in the bill. 61
The default delay in the approval of an ANDA while a patent infringement suit was ongoing was extended
from 18 months to 30. Most of the anti-evergreening provisions were deleted. A patent holder was now
allowed to choose which patent they wanted to extend, and were not limited to just the ﬁrst. There was a
new provision that limited extension to one patent per regulatory review period.
A signiﬁcant victory for the research companies was the inclusion of several new exclusivity periods. These
new exclusivity periods for pioneer drugs were awarded independently from any patent term restoration, and
even drugs that were unpatentable were able to get some exclusivity protection on the market.
There is no legislative history of these negotiations, and many criticized the way in which the deal was
struck. Kastenmeier charged that the big brand-name drug companies had gained concessions as a ”result of
negotiations taking place in the back rooms of the Senate.’62 He also stated that ’[t]he agreement is not the
result of thoughtful consideration but the result of a backroom deal of two branches of the drug industry.’63
However, this bill, S. 2926, with its new amendments was introduced to the Senate on August 10, 1984, and
passed with only one dissenting vote.
In the House, Waxman insisted that one of the exclusivity provisions, the 5-year exclusivity provision, be
changed to 4 years when the applicant is challenging the original NDA holder’s patent. His intention was
to allow a generic to enter the market more quickly should the patent be invalid or non-infringing. For the
61Martha M. Hamilton, Drug Companies Lobby to Revise Compromise Bill, The Washington Post, July 29, 1984, at G1.
62Irvin Molotsky, House Endorses Measure Aiding Low-Cost Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1984, at A1.
63Id.
25most part, though, little change was made, to avoid upsetting the tenuous balance that had been achieved.
Some unrelated provisions were added,64 and then the bill was passed by a 362-0 vote on September 6th.
The Senate passed the House version by voice vote on Sept. 12, and President Reagan signed the bill on
Sept. 24, 1984.
D. An Uneasy Compromise
The overwhelming vote in favor of passage should not be construed as near unanimous and unconditional
support for the Act. It seems that many were afraid that any changes to the ﬁnal compromise would be the
death of the bill. In the debate on Sept. 6, 1984, over the change from the delay in approval of an ANDA from
18 months to 30 months, Waxman made the following comments in opposition to an amendment attempting
to change the period back to 18 months: [T]he change from 18 months to 30 months was a change agreed
upon as part of a package to bring along all of the groups that were interested in this legislation.65
There were many, including members of the PMA66 and Congress, who were unhappy with the partial
64A textile labeling amendment was added to the bill.
65Cong. Rec. of September 6, 1984, at H9115. Responding to an attempt to amend the bill, Waxman continued with the
following explanation:
I must tell you that while we may want the legislative process to be only Congressmen and Senators discussing the issues on
a certain academic, intellectual level, there is a practical level by which people deal in day-to-day life. And the pharmaceutical
manufacturers had an enormous amount of distrust with the generic manufacturers, the feeling that they may challenge a lot
of patents that were quite valid. And the distrust ran the other way as well....
The 18-month ﬁgure was a compromise. It was a compromise that brought onboard the Pharmaceutical Manufactuers Associ-
ation along with the generic drug groups.
The change from 18 months to 30 months was a change that brought on the dissident groups within the PMA and has brought
us to a package new that we can say with conﬁdence is opposed by no one and backed by all of the groups concerned because
their deﬁnition of reality has been redeﬁned by virtue of this process having taken place... I appreciate the signiﬁcance of the
legislative process, but let us not elevate procedure over substance.
What we have here is substantively a very good bill in the public interest. The public will beneﬁt twice; by the further
incentive for research and development for new, innovative drugs and by the immediate reduction in drug prices when a generic
is on the market as a competitor.
That is a very worthwhile objective for this Congress to accomplish. Cong. Rec. of September 6, 1984, at H9118.
66Not all the research-intensive companies approved the compromise, particularly for having to cede the victory in Roche v.
26reversal of Roche v. Bolar. Representative DeWine stated that [t]he Bolar decision is sound law and in my
opinion should be retained... whether or not [the reversal of the Bolar decision] is constitutional, it seems to
me it is bad public policy and should be rejected by this Congress.67 Representative Moorhead remarked:
[T]he proposed reversal of Roche against Bolar, especially if done retroactively, is clearly in
conﬂict with the position which the United States has advocated internationally... I would
like the record to show: that there are some of us including the administration who strongly
believe that that [sic] reversal of the Bolar case is not good policy. But I will nonetheless
vote in favor of the compromise.68
Perhaps the feelings of many of the parties involved was best summed up by Senator Metzenbaum: I still
have reservations. I still have concerns. I will not oppose this legislation. I am not at all certain that the
Senate, when it passes it his evening, will be doing the right thing, but I will not stand in the way of the
passage.69 Apparently, [t]he political appeal of a bill purporting to reduce senior citizens’ expenses proved
irresistible in an election year.70
Bolar... Donald G. Daus, Patent Term Restoration: New U.S. Legislation, 83 Patent and Trademark Review 81, at 86 (1985).
67Cong. Rec. of August 8, 1984, at H8710.
69Cong. Rec. S10506 (daily ed. August 10, 1984)..
70Daus, supra note 66, at 86.
27IV. THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT
The DPC-PTR is not a simple piece of legislation. The following provides a brief overview of the result of
the compromises agreed upon in the 98th Congress.71
The Act has three titles. Title I amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §355. Title
II amends the Patent Statute. Title III is an unrelated amendment pertaining to the labeling of certain
textiles and will not be discussed.
A. Title I
Title I of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act amended the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).72
1. ANDAs
Section 102 amends 21 U.S.C. §505 to allow for the creation of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
for the approval of a new drug.73 For generic drugs that are the “same” as a pioneer drug that has been
previously approved by the FDA, information is to be provided that eight requirements are met:
71For a more comprehensive look at the Act, see Ellen J. Flannery and Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and
Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 Food Drug
Cosmetic Journal 269 (1985).
7221 U.S.C. 355.
7321 U.S.C. 355 §505(j).
281) All the indications that the generic drug is seeking approval for must have
been approved for the pioneer drug.
2) All the active ingredients of the generic drug are the same as those in the pioneer drug
3) The route of administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the generic drug are the
same as the pioneer.
4) The generic drug must be bioequivalent to the pioneer, deﬁned in Section 505(j)(7)(B).
5) The labeling must be the same, except for the manufacturer.
6) Must have full list of components, full statement of the composition of the drug, full
description of the manufacturing processes, samples, and specimens of the labeling.
7) Applicants must certify, with respect to any patents which cover the pioneer drug, 1) there
is no patent, 2) the patent has expired, 3) the date a relevant patent will expire, or 4) that the
applicant feels the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug.
8) If there are use patents that cover the pioneer, applicant must state that approval is not
being sought for the uses covered by the patent.
The FDA cannot require that information other than that speciﬁed in the statute to be submitted.74
For drugs that are “diﬀerent” from the pioneer drug, the applicant must ﬁrst submit a petition to ﬁle an
ANDA under section 505(j)(2)(C), demonstrating that the generic drug does not need to be submitted to
the full NDA standards for human and animal safety and eﬀectiveness studies. An ANDA that is submitted
after approval of the petition must then meet the above eight requirements, as modiﬁed to accommodate
the diﬀerences between the active ingredients.
If the applicant choose to request an approval date for its ANDA which precedes the expiration date of
the pioneer drug, the patent owner and pioneer NDA holder must each be notiﬁed at the same time the
74The Secretary may not require that an abbreviated application contain information in addition to that required by clauses
(i) through (viii). Sec. 505(j)(2)(A).
29ANDA is submitted. As long as one patent is challenged, the notice provisions are triggered. As long as
an infringement suit is brought on one patent, the thirty-month period where an ANDA cannot be made
eﬀective is invoked.
There are eleven reasons why the ANDA should disapproved:
1) If the methods and controls used to manufacture the drug are inadequate;
2) If there is inadequate information that each of the conditions that the drug will be used for
have been previously approved for the listed drug;
3) If the active ingredient or ingredients is not the same as the listed drug, unless a petition for
the diﬀerence has been granted;
4) If there is inadequate information that the route of administration, dosage form, or strength
is diﬀerent than the listed drug;
5) If the generic diﬀers from the listed drug and the FDA does not receive additional information
requested in addition to the petition,
6) If there is a failure to show bioequivalence with the listed drug;
7) If the proposed labeling for the generic is not shown to be the same as the listed drug;
8) If any of the inactive ingredients is shown to be unsafe;
9) If the listed drug has been withdrawn or suspended for reasons of safety or eﬀectiveness;
10) If it does not meet all of the eight requirements listed in section 505 for an ANDA; and
11) If it contains untrue statements of material fact.
30The FDA should approve or disapprove of the ANDA within 180 days of the receipt of the application. If
the applicant certiﬁed according to paragraph (i) or (ii), then the approval can be eﬀective immediately. A
paragraph (iii) approval is made eﬀective on the date that the patent expires.
An approved application with a paragraph (iv) certiﬁcation is made eﬀective immediately, unless an action
is brought by the patent owner for infringement within 45 days of the receipt of the notice. If the action is
brought, then approval shall be made eﬀective in 30 months, or another period that the court decides upon.
If the patent is declared invalid, the approval is eﬀective immediately. If the court decides the patent is
infringed, the approval is made eﬀective subject to 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(4)(A). If the court issues a preliminary
injunction before the expiration of the 30 month period, the approval shall be made after the court decides
the patent is invalid or not infringed. No action can be made for a declaratory judgment with respect to the
patent during the 45 day period.
2. Exclusivity Periods
Section 505(j)(4)(D) denotes ﬁve types of exclusivity for pioneer drugs after the approval of a pioneer NDA
or supplemental NDA.75
75This provision applies to non-prescription over the counterdrugs as well as prescription drugs. An attempted amendment to
remove OTC drugs from the scope of the exclusivit provisions was defeated. See Cong. Rec. of Sept. 6, 1984 at H9120-H9125.
311) ANDAs for New Chemical Entities (NCEs) that have pioneer NDAs approved
between Jan. 1, 1982 and Sept. 24, 1984 cannot be made eﬀective until ten years after the date
of approval of the pioneer NDA;
2) ANDAs for NCEs that obtain approval after Sept. 24, 1984 have exclusivity until ﬁve years
after approval, unless a paragraph (iv) challenge is made to the patent on the drug, at which
point the exclusivity is for four years;
3) ANDAs for generic versions of post-enactment non-NCEs cannot be approved until three
years after the date of approval for a pioneer NDA;
4) Supplemental NDAs get three years of exclusivity, regardless of whether the drug was an
NCE or not;
5) Non-NCE drugs approved between Jan. 1, 1982 and Sept. 24, 1984 get two years of exclusivity.
3. Pioneer NDAs, paper NDAs, and Trade Secret Information
Section 102 added new requirements for NDAs. Section 505(b) now requires NDA applicants to identify
all relevant patents associated with the NDA. The FDA publishes approved NDAs with their associated
patents.76
Under the amended section 505(c), any pioneer NDAs approved or ﬁled before the enactment of the bill
must also have any relevant patent information submitted for publication.
A failure to submit patent information was made grounds for disapproval of a NDA under Section 505(d), but
remedy can be made by submitting the information. An NDA can also be withdrawn if patent information
is not submitted (Section 505(e)).
76This published listing of drugs and their patents became known as the Orange Book.
32Section 103 deals with paper ANDAs. Section 505(b)(2) now deﬁnes paper NDAs, which allow the submission
information on the safety and eﬀectiveness of the drug from studies not conducted by the applicant. Paper
NDAs are submitted under the same provisions as full NDAs, and must be submitted with certiﬁcations as
to any relevant patents. FDA should treat paper NDAs in a similar manner as it treats ANDAs.
Section 104 of the act adds Sections 505(l) and (m) to the FFDCA. Secion 505(m) deﬁned the patents referred
to in the Act as being U.S. patents only. Section 505(l) codiﬁed FDA’s existing regulations regarding the
disclosure of safety and eﬀectiveness data.77 There are ﬁve circumstances under which information relating
to safety and eﬀectiveness submitted in an NDA are disclosed to the public:
1) the NDA has been abandoned;
2) the FDA determines that the NDA is not approvable and appeals have been exhausted;
3)if approval has been withdrawn and all appeals are exhausted;
4) the drug that is subject to the NDA is not a new drug; and
5) upon the eﬀective date of an ANDA, or the date when an ANDA could be made
eﬀective if one had been submitted.
The loss of trade secret protection was a big concern amongst the major research companies. Representative
Bliley was also concerned with reducing America’s competitiveness with foreign companies:
77130 Cong. Rec. S10,988-89 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1984).
33The bill reported by the Committee provides for the public disclosure of all of the extensive
and costly research data generated by research-oriented pharmaceutical companies, even
though those safety and eﬀectiveness data my be of signiﬁcant value to foreign competitors...
By providing for the release of these data, the bill hands to foreign competitors of U.S. drug
ﬁrms, for the mere price of photocopying charges, data which cost many millions of dollars
to obtain and which can be sued to obtain approval to market drugs in competition with the
owner and generator of the data. This provision of H.R. 3605 is hardly the way to protect
and improve the competitiveness of America’s pharmaceutical industry.78
However, Representative Waxman replied that this scenario is highly unlikely, and that the FDA would have
the discretion to withhold information that it felt was justiﬁed in being kept conﬁdential:
In commenting on the FDA’s proposed regulation, several commenters addressed this
same point and argued that such data were trade secrets and should be withheld. The
FDA reviewed those arguments and in the preamble of the regulations said ’none of the
comments submitted demonstrated an likelihood that the full reports of such information,
as contrasted with summaries, are required under foreign law in order to justify market-
ing abroad.’... However, the FDA said that extraordinary circumstances might justify
denying disclosure if a ’speciﬁc instance arise[s] in which a competitive advantage can be
demonstrated in concrete terms.’ Section 104 of the bill adopts this same approach.79
Under Section 105 of the Act, FDA must promulgate regulations implementing the act within one year
of enactment. Section 105(b) provides interim procedures until the new regulations are enacted. Post 1962
ANDAs and paper NDAs can be submitted using the same process as pre-1962 applications. Furthermore,
no ANDAs can be submitted until 60 days after the enactment of the Act (Nov. 23, 1984).
Finally, Section 106 of the Act amended 28 U.S.C. §2201, limiting actions brought with respect to drug
patents to the ones described in section 505 of the FFDCA.
B. Title II
Title II of the 1984 Act made two major amendments to the patent statute. The ﬁrst amendment was to
add a new section, section 156, that allowed for the extension of the patent term for patents that covered
34products subject to regulatory review.
The second amendment added a new subsection to section 271, the section on infringement, which 1) reversed
the Federal Circuit decision in Roche-Bolar, and 2) deﬁned the submission of an ANDA under paragraph IV
to be an act of infringement.
351. Patent Term Restoration
Section 201 adds section 156 to the patent statute. It provides for the restoration of part of the patent
term lost to FDA premarket drug testing and approval for human drugs, food additives, color additives, and
medical devices.
Section 156(a) allows for extension product, use, and process patents are eligible to be extended, provided
they meet the following requirements: 1) the patent has not expired; 2) the patent had not previously been
extended; 3) a patent extension application is properly submitted; 4) the product was subject to regulatory
review prior to commercial marketing or use; and 5) the particular commercial marketing or use must be
the ﬁrst marketing or use permitted by the regulatory statute, or the ﬁrst use of the product manufactured
by the process that is patented. However, processes that use recombinant DNA are not subject to this ﬁrst
permitted commercial marketing or use limitation.
Section 156(b) limits the rights that are extendable to either 1) the approved uses of the product for a
product patent, 2) the approved uses and the claims of the patent for method patents, or 3) the methods of
manufacture for process patents.
Section 156(c) limits the length of the patent extension granted to be equal to the length of the regulatory
review period and also provides the formula for determining the length of an extension.
Section 156(d) outlines the procedure for submitting an application for extension, and requires that due
diligence must be used. Under Section 156(e) the PTO is to make its determination solely upon application.80
Section 156(f) gives the deﬁnitions for the terms used in the statute, and Section 156(g) provides the formula
to be used for determining the length of the regulatory review period.
80This provision is intended to reduce the administrative burden on the PTO.
362. “Artiﬁcial” Infringement
Sec. 202 of the Act amended section 271 of the patent statute so that the act of making, using, or selling
a patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development of information to be submitted
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.81 The enactment of this provision
overturned the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche-Bolar. Sec. 271(e)(3) prohibits the patent holder from
seeking relief from actions that fall under 271(e)(1). Sec. 271(e)(2) makes it an act of infringement to
submit an ANDA or paper NDA to FDA that challenges the validity of a patent (a paragraph (iv) ANDA
submission). The exclusive remedy for a 271(e)(2) infringement is found in Sec. 271(e)(4).
As Justice Scalia describes it, The function of [Sections 271(e)(2) and (4)] is to deﬁne a new (and somewhat
artiﬁcial) act of infringement for a very limited and technical purpose that relates only to certain drug
applications.82 Scalia explained how the new provisions work in further detail:
This scheme will not work, of course, if the holder of the patent pertaining to the pioneer
drug is disabled from establishing in court that there has been an act of infringement. And
that was precisely the disability that the new §271(e)(1) imposed, with regard to use of his
patented invention only for the purpose of obtaining premarketing approval. Thus, an act
of infringement had to be created for these ANDA and paper NDA proceedings. That is
what is achieved by §271(e)(2)- the creation of a highly artiﬁcial act of infringement that
consists of submitting an ANDA or a paper NDA containing the fourth type of certiﬁcation
that is in error as to whether commercial manufacture, use , or sale of the new drug (none of
which, of course, has actually occurred) violates the relevant patent. Not only is the deﬁned
act of infringement artiﬁcial, so are the speciﬁed consequences, as set forth in paragraph
(e)(4). Monetary damages are permitted only if there has been ’commercial manufacture,
use, or sale,’ 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C). Quite obviously, the purpose of (e)(2) and (e)(4) is
to enable the judicial adjudication upon which ANDA and paper NDA schemes depend.83
8135 U.S.C. 271(e)(1).
82Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, at (1989).
37Sec. 203 of the Act amends Section 282 of the patent statute, so that patent term extensions that were
granted due to a failure by the applicant or the Commissioner to comply with the requirements for extension
are an aﬃrmative defense to actions of infringement if the action is brought during the extended period.
38V. POST-ENACTMENT
“This act is the most important statute aﬀecting the drug industry since 1962. While the new law strikes
a balance between increased patent protection and increased competition from generic drug products, it
remains to be seen whether this balance is as even as Congress and the industry intended. This will become
clear only after its implementation, and thus the law’s full impact may not be felt for several years.”84
As illustrated above, the parties on both sides were not completely satisﬁed with the DPC-PTR Act, and
also had a great deal of distrust for each another. The passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act did not end the battling between the patent owners of pioneer drugs and the generic
drug industry and their supporters.
A. “Serious” Actions After Enactment
In the time immediately following the passage of the DPC-PTR Act, the coalition that was formed to past
the Act fell apart. Generic drug manufacturers moved quickly to enter the market, and the pioneer drug
companies did what they could to stop them.
The pioneer drug manufacturers were accused of attempting to slow down the approval process by swamping
the FDA with paperwork. Critics point to the number of petitions that have been ﬁled by brand-name
companies as the reason for the slowdown in FDA approval of generics.85 One example of this alleged
behavior that critics pointed to was Hoﬀman-LaRoche’s submission of a petition to the FDA two days
before its patent on Valium expired, objecting to the FDA’s guidelines for determining whether the generic
drugs are the therapeutic equivalent of Valium. Hoﬀman-LaRoche asserted that a study by another company
84Flannery, supra note 71, at 309.
85Sari Horowitz, New Law Stimulating Generic-Drug Market; Certiﬁcation Process Simpliﬁed, Washington Post, June 28th,
1985, at B2.
39that compared generic versions with Valium found that the other drugs didn’t work as eﬀectively as Valium.
The critics said that the Hoﬀman-LaRoche petition and other similar actions were merely attempts to
delay generic-drug approval by requiring the same FDA personnel who would be approving generic-drug
applications to examine and answer the petitions.86
The lack of public knowledge also caused problems for generics attempting to enter the market. Many
consumers did not know enough about generic drugs in order to make informed decisions.
“Consumers, in general, are confused about generics, according to AARP. In a national
survey of about 1,000 consumers over age 45, 60 percent said they knew what a generic drug
was. Of that group, 19 percent said they thought that brand-name drugs were required by
the FDA to meet higher standards than generics, while 7 percent said they didn’t know.
Twenty-ﬁve percent thought that only a few generics had been found by the FDA to be
equivalent to brand-name drugs, while 12 percent said they didn’t know.”87
Furthermore, the major pharmaceutical manufacturers were aggressively marketing their drugs to doctors,
hinting that the quality of generic copies was not as safe or eﬀective, or at the least, that it would be ill-
advised to switch patients from a pioneer drug to a generic.88
Representative Waxman, responding to these tactics, felt betrayed by the major pharmaceutical companies.
Once the law was signed, the companies broke their commitments and launched an aggressive anti-generic
campaign... They are spending millions of dollars on false and misleading advertising to raise doubts in the
minds of physicians, pharmacists and consumers about the safety and eﬀectiveness of generic drugs.89
At this time there were also industry-wide increases in the prices of many pioneer drugs. “A ...less benign
eﬀect of the 1984 legislation may be that the price of new drugs will be dramatically higher...”90 This
should have been seen as a natural outcome of the changes made to the law. “In part, the increased prices
86Id.
88Tamar Lewin, Drug Makers Fighting Back Against Advance of Generics, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, at A1.
89Sandy Rovner, Cheaper Pills an Ocean Away; Rising Costs inU.S. Blamed on Research Expenses, Patent Protections,
Washington Post, July 10, 1985, at Health 7.
90Peck, supra note 3, at 544.
40will reﬂect higher research costs...However, the Waxman-Hatch Amendments have put additional pressure
on companies to price breakthrough products aggressively.”91
Members of the PMA cited the increasing costs of research and the need for readjustment that had been
delayed. Critics came back with attacks that the increased cost was due to increased advertising and proﬁting,
at the expense of the ill and elderly. Waxman stated that “one can only conclude that what is going on in
this industry is greed on a massive scale.92 In 1985 he called hearings on the issue of the sharply increasing
costs in pharmaceuticals.93
The reseach-based pharmaceutical companies were not the only ones criticized for abusing the changes in
the law. In 1989, it was revealed that several generic drug companies had paid oﬀ FDA oﬃcials to expedite
the approval of ANDAs they had submitted to the agency.94 While there was no actual harm done to the
health of the public, the scandal rocked the industry and FDA, setting oﬀ a ﬂurry of internal reform and
the re-emergence of active congressional oversight.
Many felt that Congress had placed too much emphasis on the speed of the generic approval process,
sacriﬁcing safety considerations.95 The 1984 amendments, and Congress’ many signals to the FDA on their
implementation, established a system that made the scandal perhaps not inevitable, but, in retrospect, at
least probable.96 The DPC-PTR had changed the basic nature and role of the FFDCA and FDA. The
91Peck, supra note 3, at 544.
92Associated Press, Prescription Drug Costs Up 56% Since ‘81, Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1985, at 1-1.
93Associated Press, House seeks Rx for Drug Prices Firms Reject Charges of ‘Greed’, Chicago Tribune, July 16, 1985, at C4.
94Larry Thompson, How Safe ar the Drugs You Take, Scandal at FDA Raises New Questions About Generic Medicines,
Washington Post, August 22, 1985, at Z12.
95Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Origins of the Generic Drug Scandal and Proposed Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 45 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 385, 386 (1990).
96Id. at 387.
41DPC-PTR was mainly concerned with economical issues, instead of safety and eﬀectiveness considerations.
“Unlike other major amendments to the Act, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments have had more to do with
economics than with safety and eﬀectiveness... the Food and Drug Administration... was having to arbitrate
purely competitive interests for essentially the ﬁrst time.97
B. “Humorous” Interpretations by the Courts
On August 10, 1984, Senator Metzenbaum made the following remarks:
[T]here are many people asking what this bill is all about: what it means; how do you
interpret it. Let me say, for one, that I interpret it in only one manner. Nobody can change
the language of the legislation. It speaks for itself. So notwithstanding anybody who may
feel that they can interpret the language of this legislation in one way or another, I want
the courts to understand that the legislation speaks for itself and the interpretation which
anyone may make on the ﬂoor does not really add anything to that interpretation.98
Unfortunately, Senator Metzenbaum may be the only one who felt this way. Courts and others attempting
to resolve controversies over interpretation of the Act will confront complex and often ambiguous statutory
language. Their task of statutory construction will not often be facilitated by the legislative history, which
is relatively sparse and fails to elucidate some of the Act’s key provisions.99 The task is further complicated
since the two principle purposes of the Act, to increase patent protection while also opening up the market
to competitors, are in conﬂict with one another.
The following is a summary of some of the unusual and quirky decisions that resulted from litigation involving
the DPC-PTR Act.
97Id.
99Flannery, supra note 71, at 271.
421. Glaxo v. Quigg100 and Abbott Laboratories v. Young101
Glaxo was the assignee of a patent (‘320 patent) for cefuroximine axetil, an antibiotic drug, issued on May 12,
1981. It sought received approval from FDA to market the drug in 1985 and received approval on December
28, 1987. Cefuroximine axetil is an ester of cerfuoximine. Cerfuoximine and two of its salts are claimed
in a patent owned by Glaxo. These salts, in various forms and dosages, had been approved by FDA for
marketing in 1983, 1986, and 1987. When Glaxo sought a patent extension term for its ‘320 patent, the
Commissioner of the PTO denied the extension, asserting that the 1987 approval was not the ﬁrst permitted
commercial marketing or use of the “product” and therefore was ineligible for extension. The Commissioner’s
interpretation rests on the fact that both products, after ingestion, produce the same therapeutically active
substance within the body.
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, concluding that “section 156(f)(2)’s terms, ‘active
ingredient of a new drug ...including any salt or ester of the active ingredient,’ all have a plain meaning.”
The court looked to the legislative history to see if it could ﬁnd a clear intent contrary to the plain meaning
of the statutory language. Although the Commissioner’s interpretation was consistent with the general
purposes of the DPC-PTR Act, the court determined that it is the statutory text that must be controlling,
for “the plain meaning can be said to provide exactly how the general objectives of the Act are to be sought.
This is all the more so when, as here, the two objectives are divergent if not in outright opposition to one
another.”102
In Abbott v. Young, an agency’s interpretation of “active ingredient” to mean “active moiety” was again at
issue. Abbott Laboratories (Abbott) received approval from FDA to market Depakene, an antidepressant
drug. The chemical ingredient that performs the therapeutic function is valproic acid, which is both the
100Glaxo Operations UK Limited v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
101Abbott Laboratories v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
102Glaxo, 894 F.2d at 396
43active ingredient and the active moiety. In 1982 FDA granted approval to Abbott to market Depakote for the
treatment of seizures. The active moiety in Depakote was the same as in Depakene, but the active ingredient
was a “salt” of valproic acid. Since approval was granted during the two-year window for “pipeline drugs”,
Depakote was eligible for a period of exclusivity. However, FDA determined that Depakote could only be
granted a 2-year period of exclusivity because it was a salt of the active ingredient of the prior-approved
Depakene. FDA subsequently rejected Abbott’s petition for a ten-year period of exclusivity. The district
court aﬃrmed FDA’s decision, and Abbott appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit concluded that “the language is ambiguous as it relates to the issue before us.” Applying
the two-part Chevron test, the court found that 1) Congress did not manifest an “unambiguously expressed
intent” on the statute’s meaning, but that 2) the government’s construction does not fall within the bounds
of reasonableness.
However, the court also declined to adopt Abbott’s interpretation. “Abbott’s interpretation, unlike the
FDA’s, is possible linguistically but fails to serve any conceivable statutory purpose.” The court was therefore
left with “an unusual case in which both the appellant and the government present us with unreasonable
interpretations of a statute we think ambiguous.”103
Being unable to place its own construction on the statute, the court remanded the case back to FDA.
“Congress did not directly address the ‘precise question at issue,’ ... and therefore the FDA (not the
judiciary) is entitled to place its reasonable construction on the ambiguous statute.”104 The dissent criticizes
the majority decision, agreeing with the Federal Circuit in Glaxo that the “plain language” of the statute
should be controlling.
103Id. at 985.
104Abbott, 920 F.2d at 989
44So apparently, the drafters of the DPC-PTR were able to make the term “active ingredient” ambiguous and
straightforward at the same time!105
2. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic106
This litigation was initiated over the scope of 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1). Eli Lilly claimed infringement by
Medtronic of two of its patents related to a medical device. Medtronic countered with the assertion that
its research and development of its product were covered by § 271(e)(1), since the Eli Lilly’s product had
undergone a regulatory review under the FFDCA, which also regulated drugs. The statute reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1).
Medtronic contended that if any Federal law had sections pertaining to the regulation of drugs, then the
products regulated under any part of that law could take advantage of the § 271(e) exemption. Eli Lilly
argued that the exemption was only available for products regulated by sections of the DPC-PTR Act that
dealt directly with the regulation of drugs only.
Justice Scalia noted that what was important was not to examine the diﬀerences in the approval processes
for drugs and for medical devices, but rather to determine if there was a distinction between patents for
drugs and for medical devices. Scalia stated: “If only the former patents [patents for drugs] were meant to
be included, there were available such inﬁnitely more clear and simply ways of expressing that intent that it
105As the ten-year exclusivity provision was only available to drugs within a narrow two-year window, there will most likely
not be an attempt to reconcile the two diﬀerent interpretations. For more on these two cases, see Kevin J. McGough, Preserving
the Compromise: The Plain Meaning of Waxman-Hatch Market Exclusivity, 45 Food Drug Cosmetic Journal 487 (1990).
106Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1989).
45is hard to believe the convoluted manner petitioner suggests was employed would have been selected.”107 If
Congress meant to limit the provision only to drugs, then it would have chosen clearer language.
However, Scalia also noted that Medtronic did not have a clear-cut case either. “On the other side of the
ledger, however, one must admit that while the provision more naturally means what respondent suggests,
it is somewhat diﬃcult to understand why anyone would want it to mean that. Why should the touchstone
of noninfringement be whether the use is related to the development and submission of information under a
provision that happens to be included within an Act that, in any of its provisions, not necessarily the one
at issue, regulates drugs?108
The Court looked to the legislative history, but found little guidance. As far as the text is concerned,
therefore, we conclude that we have before us a provision that somewhat more naturally reads as the Court
of Appeals determined, but that is not plainly comprehensible on anyone’s view.”109 Although the Court
found little guidance in the legislative history, 110 the Court aﬃrmed the Federal Circuit’s decision based
upon “the structure of the 1984 act taken as a whole.”111
In upholding the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Court determined that adopting Eli Lilly’s interpretation
would result in an imbalance between sections 201 and 202 of the DPC-PTR Act. It seemed “implausible” to
Scalia that Congress would extend the patent terms for medical devices, color additives, etc., but not allow
testing under § 271(e)(1), thereby aggravating the back-end distortion of the patent term. Scalia also found
that the Federal Circuit’s decision was not contradicted by the other provisions of § 271(e), § 271(e)(2) and
e(4), that are clearly to be used only in the context of the FDA drug approval process.112
“No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform §271(e) into an elegant piece of statutory
107Id. at 667.
108Id. at 668.
109Id. at 669.
110“Both parties seek to enlist legislative history in support of their interpretation, but that sheds no clear light. Id.
111Id.
112Id. at 678.
46draftsmanship.” So, in order to save the statute from its own inconsistencies, and to keep Congress from
looking like they didn’t know what was going on, Justice Scalia had to make a “drug” be more than drug.113
3. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg 114
Hoechst owned a patent on the drug pentoxifylline,115 which was issued on June 5, 1973. It then submitted
an NDA with the FDA, but did not receive approval for the drug until August 30, 1984, more than ten years
after the patent had issued. On October 29, 1984, Hoechst applied for a patent term extension under 35
U.S.C. §156. The PTO rejected the application, stating that the drug had not been subject to a regulatory
review period within the meaning of the statute, §156(a)(4). Hoechst then appealed the Commissioner’s
decision in federal district court, which determined that the language of the statute was ambiguous, and
that the legislative history did not show evidence of Congress’ intent to provide patent extension to Hoechst’s
patent.116
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, and granted Hoechst a 6.8-year extension
on its patent covering pentoxifylline! In examining the issue of whether or not pentoxifylline underwent
a regulatory review period under the deﬁnition of the statute, the court looked to the deﬁnition in sec.
156(g)(1).
113For more on the interpretation of section 271(e), see James M. Flaherty Jr., Article: PMA Primacy: Synthesizing the 35
U.S.C. § 156 Patent Term Extension, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Patent Infringement Exemption as Currently Applied to Medical
Devices, and Medical Device Preemption Jurisprudence to Yield a Cohesive Solution Regarding Scope of Coverage, 56 Food
Drug L.J. 339 (2001); Samuel M. Kais, NOTE: A SURVEY OF 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1) AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS:
THE INFRINGEMENT EXEMPTION CREATED BY THE 1984 PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT, 13 Computer &
High Tech. L.J. 575 (1997); David J. Bloch, ARTICLE: If It’s Regulated Like a Duck... Uncertainties in Implementing the
Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 54 Food Drug L.J. 111 (1999); Brian D.
Coggio and Francis D. Cerrito, ARTICLE: THE APPLICATION OF THE PATENT LAWS TO THE DRUG APPROVAL
PROCESS, 52 Food Drug L.J. 345 (1997).
114Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Donald J. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
115The tradename for pentoxifylline was Trental.
116Hoechst Aktiengesellshaft v. Quigg, 724 F.Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1989).
47The language at issue is sec. 156(g)(1)(A): to which the limitation described in paragraph (6) applies.
Paragraph (6) deﬁnes three limitations. For patents issued after the date of the statute’s enactment, an
extension could be no longer than ﬁve years. If the patent issued before the date of enactment and no
request for extension under (1)(B) was submitted before the date of the statute’s enactment, the extension
granted could be for no longer than 5 years. For patents that had issued before the act’s enactment, but
had not received approval as of the day of enactment, the extension was limited to two years.
However, these three limitations did not cover the situation presented by Hoechst’s patent, where the patent
issued, the drug received approval before the date of enactment, and the request for approval came after
the Act’s enactment. The PTO argued that since this wasn’t covered in paragraph (g)(6), Congress did
not allow for a patent term extension. Hoechst argued that Congress’s failure to place a cap on the length
of term extensions for the Trental patent and the small number of other drug patents which received FDA
approval shortly before the Act’s passage, was simply an oversight.117
The Federal Circuit determined that it was unclear that Congress intended not to limit the extensions to
drugs that had received approval shortly before the enactment of the Act. The legislative history is silent on
this issue.118 But it determined that Congress’ intentions were clear in deﬁning a regulatory review period
and consequently awarding a patent term extension. Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of the statute, the
granting of a patent term extension and the limiting of a patent term extension were two totally separate
issues.
Legislative history explicitly indicating that no patent term extension be greater than ﬁve
years has no bearing on how Congress intended to deﬁne a regulatory review period under
the Act. Whether a drug has undergone a regulatory review period and the related patent
is eligible for a term extension and how that extension should be limited are two completely
diﬀerent issues.119
117Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 525.
118Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 529.
48As a result, Hoechst not only received a patent extension, but a bonus as well!
Although we are convinced that the plain language of the statute and the relevant legislative
history mandate that a term extension be given to the ’433 patent, we acknowledge that
a 6.8 year term extension is a windfall for Hoechst that was probably not contemplated
by Congress. Indeed, the undisputed fact that Congress wished to limit the maximum
term extension to ﬁve years is what motivated the Commissioner to deny Hoechst a term
extension in the ﬁrst place. Nevertheless, ’it is not for us to distort the statute to ’ﬁx’ what
Congress either intentionally or inadvertently failed to anticipate.’120
A pretty bizarre result, given that the court seems to have found clear legislative intent that Congress did
not want to grant extensions to patents for more than ﬁve years.
4. SmithKline v. Watson Pharmaceuticals121
SmithKline obtained FDA approval to market its patented nicotine gum, Nicorette, on January 13, 1984,
for prescription-only use at a 2 mg dosage. On June 8, 1992, SmithKline received approval from the FDA
to market Nicorette at 4 mg for prescription use only, and on February 9, 1996, for over-the-counter use at
the 2 mg and 4 mg dosages. SmithKline was able to receive a three-year period of exclusivity pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(iv), due to the additional clinical testing done on Nicorette.
In conjunction with the marketing of Nicorette, SmithKline developed a user’s guide and audiotape, which
was submitted to FDA for approval. The tape and guide became part of Nicorette’s FDA-approved OTC
labeling. SmithKline registered a federal copyright for the guide and audiotape script on April 21, 1998, and
on February 9 (the last day of its three-year exclusivity period), SmithKline registered a copyright for the
words and music for the tape.
After the three-year exclusivity period had passed, Watson submitted an ANDA to the FDA to obtain
121Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2nd Cir. 2000)
49marketing approval for a generic version of Nicorette. In order to comply with the provision of the DPC-
PTR Act, Watson had to submit a user’s guide and audiotape that were virtually identical to the ones
that are packaged with Nicorette. SmithKline then initiated a copyright infringement action, alleging willful
infringement of its guide and tapes. SmithKline was able to obtain a preliminary injunction from a federal
district court, enjoining Watson from infringing on its copyrighted label for Nicorette.122
The FDA was asked by Watson and the district court for its opinion on the issue. The FDA initially held
that there was enough leeway that could be used in the labeling to avoid copyright issues, but then reversed
itself and said that under the statutes that govern it, the labeling had to be almost identical, while also
stating that it was not empowered by Congress to deal with copyright concerns in drug labeling.
Because of this, the court subsequently found that the balance of the hardships of an injunction would fall
upon Watson, so the court dissolved the injunction.123 SmithKline then received a stay and an appeal from
the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals.
We do not doubt that SmithKline has demonstrated the existence of substantial issues under the copyright
laws, at least when they are considered in isolation...Absent more, the propriety of a preliminary injunction
would seem clear.124 The court therefore rejected Watson’s implied license and fair use arguments.
However, the court found that the FFDCA mandated that since generic drug producers are required to use
the same label as the pioneer drug, it must be allowed to do so, even if the label has been copyrighted.
Because those Amendments were designed to facilitate rather than impede the approval and OTC sale of
generic drugs, the FDA’s requirement that Watson use much of SmithKline’s label precludes a copyright
infringement action by SmithKline.125 In doing so, the court looks explicitly to the principle purposes of each
in making its interpretation. Congress would have provided explicitly that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
122SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
123SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19677, No. 99 Civ.
9214, 1999 WL 1243894, at *5- *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1999).
124SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 25.
125Id. at 25.
50trump the copyright laws had it foreseen the statutory conﬂict exposed by the present action,... we ﬁrmly
believe that to be obvious.126
Therefore, Appellees cannot be liable for copyright infringement because the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
require generic drug producers to use the same labeling as was approved by the FDA for, and is used by, the
producer of the pioneer drug.127
If nothing else, this case illustrates the extreme measures that research-based and generic drug companies
have taken in attempts to protect or increase their market share.
126Id. at 29.
127Id. at 23.
51VI. CONCLUSION
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act was an uneasy union between two groups
with an open distrust for one another. The changes made by the DPC-PTR weakened patent law and created
complications in the interpretation of the statute. It also made an economic concern the driving force behind
an amendment of the FFDCA rather than safety and eﬀectiveness concerns. In hindsight, it may have been
better for Congress to have passed patent term restoration, and allow FDA to issue regulations pertaining
to ANDAs on its own. But despite the seriousness of the DPC-PTR, perhaps it is possible to look back on
it now and laugh a little at some of the results.
52